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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to concerns about high levels of public debt, many European countries have engaged
in large consolidation programs in recent years. The issue of the effectiveness of these pro-
grams has initiated a vivid debate on the evaluation of government spending multipliers. Two
classes of models have been extensively used to assign a quantitative value to this concept:
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and vector autoregressions (VARs).1
However, each approach has disadvantages. While DSGE models potentially face a misspeci-
fication problem in imposing excessive restrictions on the data, structural VARs might be sen-
sitive to identification strategies (Ramey, 2011a). The implications drawn from one model or
another might not reveal the true policy effects.
1The effects of government spending shocks have been studied by, amongst other scholars, Cogan et al., 2010; 
Coenen et al., 2012, Fève et al., 2013; Erceg and Lindé, 2014, using DSGE models, and by Perotti, 2005, Caldara and 
Kemps, 2012, using structural VAR models.
1
2 IN SEARCH OF THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE EURO AREA
This paper combines DSGE and VAR models to provide new insights into the transmission
mechanisms of fiscal shocks in the euro area. This DSGE-VAR approach relaxes the strong
cross-equation restrictions created by the DSGE model and thus allows possible misspecifica-
tion of the structural model to be considered (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2004, Del Negro,
Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters, 2007, and Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2009).
Armed with this original tool, we evaluate the relative contributions to the size of estimated
fiscal multipliers of two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks advanced
previously in the literature. The first relies on the presence of hand-to-mouth (HtM) consumers
in the population, i.e., households that do not have access to financial markets and simply con-
sume their disposable income in each period. Galí et al. (2007) and Forni et al. (2009) show
that the interaction of such agents with both real and nominal rigidities increases the govern-
ment spending multiplier. The second transmission mechanism allows government spending
to enter –in a non-separable way– the household’s utility function (GiU), such that government
activity directly affects the marginal utility of consumption. Bouakez and Rebei (2007), Fève et
al. (2013) and Coenen et al. (2013) show that when private consumption and public expendi-
tures display a sufficient amount of Edgeworth complementarity, households have incentives
to consume and to work more, thereby generating larger fiscal multipliers.2 Because each com-
peting model nests the Smets-Wouters specification (Baseline), one can vary the magnitude of
the parameter summarizing one of the mechanisms to understand how government spending
shocks propagate into the model economy.
Our main findings are the following. First, the Bayesian estimation shows that a DSGE
model with non-separable government spending in the utility function outperforms a model
2There exist many concrete examples for which private consumption and public expenditures are complements
(health care, education, etc.). As discussed in Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), the complementarity may reveal rel-
ative inefficiency in the provision of public goods. Let us consider the case of education. One may observe the
coexistence of public schools and private tutors if private agents consider the quality of public teachers to be too
low. In addition, the complementarity may occur because public education allows a higher level of income and
thus increases the demand for other goods (similar arguments hold for health care). Though difficult to grasp at
the aggregate level, this mechanism is a useful shortcut to quantify the influence of public spending on private
decisions.
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with hand-to-mouth consumers in terms of fit and yields larger fiscal multipliers. The ver-
sion with Edgeworth complementarity provides a multiplier of approximately 1.75, whereas
the version with hand-to-mouth consumers yields a value lower than one. Second, we use the
DSGE-VAR approach to assess the performance of each version. On impact, the multiplier is
approximately 1.5, and its estimated value is weakly affected by the model’s specification. This
result can be interpreted as suggesting that the data want a multiplier larger than one. Specif-
ically, the DSGE-VAR framework is used to investigate whether the fiscal multipliers obtained
in a constrained DSGE model are far from those obtained in a DSGE-VAR model with the same
structural features. We obtain a sizable increase in the estimated value of the multiplier in the
Baseline and HtM versions, while it remains very similar in the GiU specification and in the
model including both mechanisms. This supports our claim that Edgeworth complementarity
is a better representation of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy in the euro area.
This paper is related to recent studies investigating the size of fiscal multipliers, the trans-
mission mechanism of government spending shocks, and fiscal strategies in DSGE models of
the euro area (see, e.g., Cwik and Wieland, 2011, Coenen et al., 2012, 2013, and Cogan et al.,
2013). In particular, Coenen et al. (2013) consider HtM consumers and government spending
in the utility to gauge the effects of government activity in the euro area. Our paper extends
these works in two directions. First it considers that the DSGE model (even if it includes rel-
evant propagation mechanisms of government spending) can be misspecified and thus uses
the DSGE-VAR approach to quantify the size of the fiscal multiplier and the dynamic effects
of government spending shocks. Second, based on empirical evidence and the estimation of
different versions of the model, it investigates how the mechanisms interact at the estimation
stage and highlights the most relevant channel.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we expound the Baseline DSGE model
and the two competing propagation mechanisms. We also conduct a prior predictive analysis.
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In section 3, we present empirical results from a Bayesian estimation of different model ver-
sions. In section 4, we report the estimation of different DSGE-VAR models. The last section
concludes.
2. MEDIUM-SCALE MODELS FOR THE EURO AREA
Our investigation is based on the canonical medium-scale New-Keynesian framework de-
scribed by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007), which is currently consid-
ered sufficiently rich to fit the data well. It features utility-maximizing households, profit-
maximizing firms, a fiscal authority financing public spending with lump-sum taxes, and a
central bank setting short-term nominal interest rates according to a Taylor-type rule. The
model incorporates a number of real and nominal rigidities, including habits in consumption,
investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, and monopolistic competition in
goods and labor markets and wage and nominal price and wage rigidities with indexation.3
This setup is extended in two directions: (i) the introduction of households being hand-to-
mouth consumers and (ii) the introduction of government spending in the household utility
function in a non-separable way.
2.1. Alternative specifications. A first specification (labelled ’Baseline’) is similar to Justiniano
et al. (2010). This setup is then extended to introduce different transmission mechanisms of
government spending shocks.
As in Galí et al. (2007), we assume in a second specification (labelled ’HtM’) (i) that a frac-
tion ω of households, called hand-to-mouth consumers, do not have access to financial mar-
kets and simply consume their disposable income in each period, (ii) employment agencies do
not discriminate between household types in their labor demands, such that the number of
hours worked Nt is the same for all households. It follows that, in symmetric equilibrium, all
households have the same wage rate Wt. Therefore, the hand-to-mouth consumers set nominal
3A detailed exposition of the model is offered in Section A of the online appendix.
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consumption expenditure Cr,t equal to their disposable wage income less lump-sum taxes Tr,t.
This results in the following period-by-period budget constraint:
PtCr,t ≤WtNt − Tr,t. (1)
The consumption of households that have access to financial markets is denoted C0,t. Accord-
ingly, total private consumption is then defined as Ct = (1−ω)Co,t +ωCr,t.
A third specification (labelled ’GiU’) augments the Baseline model by including government
spending in the utility function. As in Bouakez and Rebei (2007), we allow for complemen-
tarity/substitutability between private consumption and public expenditures. Formally, the
consumption bundle C∗t is now defined as:
C∗t = Ct + αgGt, (2)
where the parameter αg measures the degree of complementarity/substitutability between pri-
vate consumption Ct and public expenditures Gt. The specification adopted here follows Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1992), McGrattan (1994), and Finn (1998), among others.4 If αg > 0,
government spending substitutes for private consumption, with perfect substitution if αg = 1,
as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). In this case, a permanent increase in government
spending has no effect on output or hours but reduces private consumption, through a perfect
crowding-out effect. In the special case in which αg = 0, we recover the standard business cycle
model, with government spending operating through a negative wealth effect on labor supply
(see Aiyagari et al., 1992, Baxter and King, 1993). When the parameter αg < 0, government
spending complements private consumption. Then, it can be the case (depending on the labor
supply elasticity) that private consumption will react positively to an unexpected increase in
government spending.
A last specification (labelled ’Full’) embeds both hand-to-mouth consumers and government
spending in the utility function in the Baseline model.
4An alternative specification is a CES function between Ct and Gt (see McGrattan et al., 1997, Bouakez and Rebei,
2007, Coenen et al., 2013). Note that these two specifications yield exactly the same log–linearized equation for the
marginal utility of consumption.
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2.2. State-space representation. After normalizing trending variables by the stochastic trend
component in labor factor productivity, we log-linearized the resulting systems in the neigh-
borhood of the deterministic steady state. Let θ denote the vector of structural parameters and
vt be the r-dimensional vector of model variables. Thus, the state-space form of the different
model specifications is characterized by the state equation:
vt = A(θ)vt−1 +B(θ)ζt, (3)
where ζt ∼ i.i.d.N
(
0,Σζ
)
is the q-dimensional vector of innovations to the structural shocks,
andA(θ) and B(θ) are complicated functions of the model’s parameters θ. The measurement
equation is given by:
xt = C(θ) +Dvt +Eet, (4)
where xt is an n-dimensional vector of observed variables, D and E are selection matrices,
et is a vector of measurement errors, and C(θ) is a vector that is a function of the structural
parameters.
2.3. Prior predictive analysis. Conditional on a given model specificationMi, i ∈ {0 (Baseline), 1
(HtM), 2 (GiU), 3 (Full)}, the prior distribution of θ is p (θ|Mi) and the likelihood function as-
sociated with the vector of ex ante observables X˜T ≡ {x˜t}Tt=1 is L
(
X˜T|θ,Mi
)
. Regardless of
how the conditional distribution of observables and the prior distribution of unobservables are
formulated, together they provide a distribution of observables with density:
L (X˜T|Mi) = ∫
θ
L (X˜T|θ,Mi) p (θ|Mi)dθ, (5)
known as the prior predictive density. It summarizes the whole range of phenomena consistent
with the model Mi and is very easy to access by means of simulations. The prior predictive
distribution summarizes the substance of the model and emphasizes that the prior distribution
and the conditional distribution of observables are inseparable components, a point forcefully
argued by Box (1980). As explained by Canova (1995), Lancaster (2004) and Geweke (2005),
prior predictive analysis is a powerful tool to shed light on complicated objects that depend on
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both the joint prior distribution of parameters and the model specification. In our context, this
analysis delivers the possible range of the government spending multiplier conditional on a
specific model. As our alternative versions differ only by a parameter, prior predictive analysis
offers precise statements concerning how a particular mechanism affects the multiplier.
In all model specifications, we calibrate few parameters: The discount factor β is set to 0.99,
the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity ν = 2, the capital depreciation rate δ is equal
to 0.025, the parameter α in the Cobb–Douglas production function is set to 0.30 to match the
average capital share in net (of fixed costs) output (McAdam and Willman, 2013), the steady–
state price and wage markups εp and εw are set to 1.20 and 1.35, respectively (Everaert and
Schule, 2008), and the steady–state share of government spending in output is set to 0.20 (the
average value over the sample period).
Our choice of priors is in line with the literature, especially with Smets and Wouters (2007),
Sahuc and Smets (2008) and Justiniano et al. (2010). We impose Beta distributions for all of the
parameters, the theoretical support of which is the compact [0,1]. We use Gamma distributions
for positive parameters. Finally, we use Inverse Gamma distributions for the standard errors
of shocks. Importantly, we are agnostic about the share of non-Ricardian households (ω) and
the degree of complementarity/substitutability between private consumption and public ex-
penditures (αg). We assume Uniform priors for these two parameters: ω is distributed on [0, 1],
and αg is distributed on [−2, 2].5
We take 1,000 draws from our prior distributions and calculate the resulting government
spending multipliers. Fiscal multipliers are defined as the present value multipliers:
Et ∑si=0 β˜
i∆Ψt+i
Et ∑si=0 β˜i∆Gt+i
, (6)
5The interval has been set such that the minimum value of αg does not imply a negative value of the marginal
utility of consumption around the deterministic steady state. By anticipating our estimation results, this prior
ensures almost certainly that the marginal utility is positive because it depends on calibrated parameters (α, β, δ),
with the only exception being the growth rate of TFP, which is estimated. However, this parameter marginally
affects the great ratios (see Section B of the online appendix) and is estimated with precision.
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where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon information avail-
able at t, β˜ ≡ β/γz is the inverse of the steady-state real interest rate, s is the selected horizon,
and Ψt = Yt (output), Ct (private consumption), It (private investment). At s = 0, the present
value multiplier equals the impact multiplier. As in Leeper et al. (2011), Table I compares the
multiplier p-values at various horizons across the four model specifications.6 The top panel of
the table reports the probability that multipliers for output exceed unity at various horizons.
The middle and lower panels report the probabilities that multipliers for consumption and
investment, respectively, are positive at various horizons.
Table I. Government spending multiplier probabilities implied by prior predictive
analysis with informative priors
Prob
( ∆Y
∆G> 1
)
Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
M0: Baseline 0.296 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.002
M1: HtM 0.846 0.553 0.372 0.302 0.308
M2: GiU 0.427 0.376 0.313 0.288 0.281
M3: Full 0.639 0.580 0.486 0.439 0.444
Prob
( ∆C
∆G> 0
)
Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
M0: Baseline 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M1: HtM 0.748 0.576 0.493 0.419 0.330
M2: GiU 0.412 0.386 0.380 0.345 0.300
M3: Full 0.623 0.582 0.544 0.515 0.467
Prob
( ∆I
∆G> 0
)
Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
M0: Baseline 0.054 0.058 0.065 0.081 0.086
M1: HtM 0.058 0.071 0.077 0.088 0.099
M2: GiU 0.384 0.384 0.390 0.391 0.399
M3: Full 0.217 0.217 0.224 0.230 0.233
Note: Baseline: Smets-Wouters type model; HtM: model with hand-to-mouth consumers;
GiU: model with government spending in the utility function; Full: model with both hand-
to-mouth consumers and government spending in the utility function.
6In the context of the prior predictive analysis, we follow Leeper et al. (2011) in choosing a prior density for ρg
defined as B[0.70,0.20].
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First, we observe that all models, even the Baseline specification, can generate impact output
multipliers greater than one. This is because greater price stickiness implies that more firms re-
spond to higher government spending by increasing production rather than prices, and hence
markups respond more strongly. However, it is impossible for the Baseline model to produce
positive consumption multipliers at any horizon. The negative wealth effect is indeed strong
because households decrease their consumption and work more. This decline in private de-
mand offsets most of the increased public demand, causing output to increase by less than the
increase in government consumption.
Fiscal multipliers increase substantially when introducing hand-to-mouth consumers or Edge-
worth complementarity/substitutability. Intuitively, as non-Ricardian households automati-
cally consume their entire income, they ignore the wealth effects of future taxes and therefore
increase their consumption when government expenditures rise. The larger the share of these
agents, the lower the overall negative wealth effect on consumption. If wages are sticky, such
that real wages increase in the very short run, then non-savers’ consumption also increases.
With sufficient non-savers in the economy, the increase in their consumption can cause total
consumption to increase, leading to larger output multipliers as well. The version includ-
ing Edgeworth complementarity/substitutability yields multipliers in line with the HtM con-
sumers version, although smaller.7 This result originates from our choice of priors for ω and
αg. Indeed, the prior mean for ω implies a sizable share of hand-to-mouth consumers, thereby
allowing for a positive consumption response. Conversely, the prior uniform distribution for
αg is centered on zero (i.e., the value from the Baseline model version), meaning that our prior
does not favor this version. Edgeworth complementarity/substitutability allows us to cover
a large range of situations for which consumption reacts positively and output multipliers are
above one. These two transmission mechanisms are by themselves sufficient to generate high
multipliers. Indeed, when we set all other parameters to their respective prior means and let
7The reason is that the prior distribution of αg is symmetric at zero.
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ω and αg be drawn from their respective prior distributions, we obtain similar probabilities as
those displayed in Table 1.8
3. DSGE MODELS COMPARISON
In this section, we discuss the estimation results of the different specifications of the struc-
tural model and present the government spending multipliers inherited from each set of esti-
mates.9
3.1. Data description. The quarterly euro area data run from 1980Q1 to 2007Q4 and are ex-
tracted from the AWM database compiled by Fagan et al. (2005), except hours worked and the
working age population. The reason for ending in 2007 is not to blur the results with the zero
lower bound episode in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Inflation pit is measured by the first
difference of the logarithm of the GDP deflator (YED), the short–term nominal interest rate Rt
is a three-month rate (STN), and real wage growth ∆ log (Wt/Pt) is the first difference of the
logarithm of the nominal wage (WRN) divided by the GDP deflator. Output growth ∆ log Yt
is obtained as the first difference of the logarithm of real GDP (YER), private consumption
growth ∆ log Ct is constructed by multiplying real private consumption (PCR) by the private
consumption deflator (PCD), divided by the GDP deflator and transformed into the first differ-
ence of the logarithm; private investment growth ∆ log It is defined as the aggregate euro area
total economy gross investment minus general government investment, scaled by the GDP
deflator and transformed into the first difference of the logarithm; and government spending
growth ∆ log Gt is defined as the nominal general government final consumption expenditure
(GCN), scaled by the GDP deflator and transformed into the first difference of the logarithm.
Real variables are divided by the working age population, extracted from the OECD Economic
Outlook. Ohanian and Raffo (2012) constructed a new dataset of quarterly hours worked for
14 OECD countries. We then derived a weighted (by country size) average of their series of
8See Table OA2 of the online appendix.
9A robustness analysis is provided in Section I of the online appendix.
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hours worked for France, Germany and Italy to obtain a series of total hours for the euro area.
Interestingly, the series thus obtained is very close to that provided by the ECB on the common
sample, i.e. 1995–2007. Total hours worked log Nt are taken in logarithms. We use growth rates
for the non-stationary variables in our data set (GDP, private consumption, private investment,
government spending and the real wage) and express gross inflation, gross interest rates and
the first difference of the logarithm of hours worked in percentage deviations from their sample
means. The vector of eight observable variables is then given by:
xt = 100× [∆ log Yt,∆ log Ct,∆ log It,∆ log Gt,∆ log (Wt/Pt) , log Nt,pit, Rt]. (7)
Our model abstracts from net exports, public investment and changes in inventories in GDP.
We then introduce a measurement error i.i.d.N (0, σ2xe) that is directly associated with output
growth.
3.2. Estimation results. We follow the Bayesian approach to estimate the models (see An and
Schorfheide, 2007, for an overview). The posterior distribution associated with the vector of
observables XT ≡ {xt}Tt=1 cannot be recovered analytically but may be computed numerically
using a Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) sampling approach. Specifically, we rely on the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain a random draw of size 1,000,000 from the posterior
distribution of the parameters.
For the sake of comparing different model versions, we resort to the following two standard
criteria. First, from p (θ|XT,Mi), one can compute the marginal likelihood of specificationMi,
which is defined as:
L (XT|Mi) =
∫
θ
L (XT|θ,Mi) p (θ|Mi)dθ. (8)
Second, given a prior probability pi on a given model specificationMi, the posterior odds
ratio is defined as:
Pi,T = piL (XT|Mi)
∑M−1j=0 pjL
(
XT|Mj
) with M−1∑
j=0
pj = 1, (9)
where M is the number of competing models.
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Table II reports information on the posterior distribution of the share of hand-to-mouth con-
sumers ω and the degree of complementarity/substitutability between private consumption
and government expenditures αg for each model version: the mean and the 90 percent confi-
dence interval for each model version.10 Several results are worth commenting on.
Table II. Posterior estimates
Parameter Model
M0: Baseline M1: HtM M2: GiU M3: Full
HtM share, ω – 0.291
[0.228,0.353]
– 0.137
[0.081,0.192]
Edgeworth compl., αg – – –1.638
[–1.862,–1.419]
–1.505
[–1.733,–1.272]
Marginal likelihood
Posterior odds ratio
–640.307
0.000
–
–630.203
0.000
0.001
–606.831
0.029
0.999
–603.316
0.971
–
Note: This table reports the mean and the 90 percent confidence interval (within square brackets) of the es-
timated posterior distribution of ω and αg. Baseline: Smets-Wouters type model; HtM: model with hand-to-
mouth consumers; GiU: model with government spending in the utility function; Full: model with both hand-
to-mouth consumers and government spending in the utility function.
The first notable result is that the two propagation mechanisms considered here are essen-
tial because they substantially improve the fit of the model (in comparison with the Baseline
model). For instance, the marginal likelihood increases from −640 in the Baseline model to
−630 in the model with hand-to-mouth consumers. The estimated share of hand-to-mouth
consumers ω is precisely estimated, with a mean of 0.29 and a 90 percent confidence interval
given by [0.228; 0.353], despite that we use a flat (uniform) prior.11 The posterior mean is close
to the value obtained by Coenen and Straub (2005, 2013) and is consistent with the values re-
ported in Kaplan et al. (2014). Using survey data on household portfolios for Germany, France,
Italy, and Spain between 2008 and 2010, Kaplan et al. (2014) obtain a share of hand-to-mouth
consumers between 20 and 32 percent, according to the country.
10The rest of the parameters are reported in Section E of the online appendix.
11See Table OA5 of the online appendix for a sensitivity analysis to the set of observables.
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However, this model version is outperformed by the model with government spending in
the utility function. This can be directly verified by inspecting the marginal likelihood and
posterior odds ratios. Beginning with a prior distribution on the two model versions with
equal probability (1/2), we obtain that the GiU model represents the whole probability mass.
The estimated value for αg is negative, suggesting a strong complementarity between private
consumption and public expenditures. This result is in line with that obtained in Coenen et al.
(2013) for the euro area.12 Using again an uninformative prior with zero mean, we obtain the
confidence interval [−1.86;−1.42] for αg.
The largest marginal likelihood is obtained when the two mechanisms are combined (see
also the high posterior odds ratio in Table 2). In this Full model version, we obtain a lower
share of hand-to-mouth consumers (ω = 0.14) and a slightly lesser complementarity between
private consumption and public expenditures (αg = −1.51). Thus, the estimation of the Full
model specification on actual data highlights a substitution between these two mechanisms.
It is worth noting that the mean value of ω in the HtM specification is outside the 90 percent
confidence interval of the Full model version. This is not the case when we consider the GiU
specification. Therefore, we can infer that a model version with Edgeworth complementarity
suffers less than a specification with hand-to-mouth consumers from the presence of a compet-
ing propagation mechanism.13
To better illustrate the trade–off between the two transmission mechanisms of fiscal shocks,
we plot draws from the posterior distributions of ω and αg in the Full model version. Figure
1 reports the outcome of this exercise. The thick plain line is the nonparametric regression,
and the thick dashed lines delineate the 90 percent confidence interval obtained by standard
12Notice that our estimated degree of Edgeworth complementarity is equivalent to an elasticity of substitution
between private and public expenditures in a CES aggregate of µces = 0.172, when assuming a private consumption
share of κ = 0.75. Indeed, µces ≡ (1− κ)
(
sc/(sc + αgsg)− κ
)
, where sc and sg denote the consumption to output
ratio and government expenditures to output ratio, respectively.
13Comparing a set of moments from actual data to those generated by alternative specifications yields additional
evidence. We observe that the Full model yields a better fit than the Smets-Wouters type model, especially with
respect to the volatility and persistence of aggregate variables (output, consumption, government expenditures,
inflation, etc.).
14 IN SEARCH OF THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE EURO AREA
bootstrap techniques. The scatter diagram corresponds to the estimation of the Full model.
Crosses indicates the average parameter values for ω and αg. This figure clearly reveals, in the
neighborhood of the posterior means (ω = 0.14 and αg = −1.51), that the two mechanisms
substitute. Importantly, a small variation in αg has strong implications for the estimated share
of hand-to-mouth consumers. For example, moving αg from -1.51 to -1.60 implies a change in
ω from 0.14 to 0.07. In other words, the GiU specification appears more robust to a model’s
perturbation, i.e., the introduction of a competing transmission mechanism, than does the HtM
specification.
Moreover, the estimated share of hand-to-mouth consumers is too low to generate a posi-
tive private consumption multiplier for government consumption shocks in a standard New-
Keynesian DSGE model (see, e.g., Coenen and Straub, 2005; Galí et al., 2007). This is confirmed
by Panel (a) of Figure 2. This figure reports the posterior distribution of ω and a grey area
representing the range of values that allow private consumption to respond positively to a
government spending shock. One obtains that ω must exceed 0.5 to generate this pattern, a
value that is far from its posterior distribution and the empirical evidence reported by Kaplan
et al. (2014). This means that the posterior estimation dramatically changes the conclusions
from the Bayesian prior predictive analysis. Conversely, the GiU model has no difficulty in cre-
ating a positive response of private consumption (see Panel (b) of Figure 2): Nearly all of the
posterior distribution lies within the grey area. The Baseline and HtM models on one side and
GiU and Full models on the other side are very similar. Consequently, the HtM specification
appears to add very little both to the Baseline model and to the GiU model. Panel (c) reports
the joint distribution of αg and ω for which the response of consumption is positive, together
with the contour of their posterior distribution. Combining the two transmission mechanisms
into the Full model shows that the model can display a positive response of consumption, but
this is essentially due to the non-zero value of αg.
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3.3. Distributions of the impact output multiplier. The value of the government spending
multiplier derives from the estimated values of ω and αg. Figure 3 reports the empirical distri-
bution of the impact output multiplier for the Full specification, and the average value of this
multiplier for the Baseline, HtM and GiU models. The figure makes clear that the estimated
multiplier differs considerably between the two model versions. In the presence of hand-to-
mouth consumers, the average output multiplier is approximately 0.80, while it is twice larger
(approximately 1.75) when government expenditures enter the household utility function. The
estimated multiplier in the HtM case slightly exceeds that obtained in the Baseline model (ap-
proximately 0.60). Moreover, the GiU and Full models yield similar multiplier values.14
Furthermore, the four model versions display nearly identical estimated values for the com-
mon structural parameters. Most of the parameter estimates are in line with previous results
(Smets and Wouters, 2003, Sahuc and Smets, 2008, Coenen et al., 2013). Neither the parameters
related to real rigidities nor those related to nominal rigidities are affected by the presence of
ω and αg.15 In addition, the parameters that govern the driving force and those describing the
monetary policy are left unaffected. This means that our additional features improve the fit of
a standard DSGE model without altering its propagation mechanisms.16
4. THE SIZE OF THE MULTIPLIER: A DSGE-VAR APPROACH
The DSGE-VAR approach has been suggested as a tool for studying the misspecification of a
DSGE model and allowing the cross-equation restrictions of the DSGE model to be relaxed in a
flexible manner (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2004, Del Negro et al., 2007).17 The basic idea is to
(i) use a VAR model as an approximating model for the DSGE model and (ii) construct a map-
ping from the DSGE model to the VAR parameters, leading to a set of cross-restrictions for the
14The contribution of the government spending shock to the short-run aggregate volatility illustrates these find-
ings, see Table OA4 in Section G of the online appendix.
15See Table OA3 of the online appendix.
16Section H of the online appendix reports the dynamic responses of output, consumption, investment and the
real interest rate to productivity and monetary policy shocks for the Baseline and Full specifications. Figures OA2
and OA3 illustrate that, whatever the specification adopted, the responses are similar.
17See also Adolfson et al., 2008, Lees et al., 2011, Warne et al., 2013, and Cole and Milani, 2014, for recent applica-
tions of the DSGE-VAR approach to forecasting exercises and misspecification analysis in DSGE models.
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VAR model. Deviations from these restrictions may be interpreted as evidence for DSGE model
misspecification. In a Bayesian framework, one can specify a prior distribution for deviations
from the DSGE model restrictions, the tightness of which is scaled by a single hyperparameter
λ. By varying this parameter from infinity to zero, we create a continuum of models with the
VAR approximation of the DSGE model at one end and an unrestricted VAR at the other end.
The marginal likelihood function of this parameter then provides an overall assessment of the
DSGE model restrictions that is more robust and informative than a comparison of the two
polar cases (unconstrained VAR model vs. DSGE model).18
4.1. Assessing the fiscal multiplier from DSGE-VARs. The first step consists in selecting the
best DSGE-VAR(λ, p) model, where p denotes the number of lags. An approach consists in
choosing the model with the largest marginal likelihood over all pairs (λ, p) and the specifi-
cation of the DSGE model. We consider lag orders ranging from one to four. Several features
emerge. First, the data favor the Full specification.19 Second, for any value of λ, the log-
marginal likelihood with one lag is always greater than that with two, three or four lags, indi-
cating that reducing the number of lags, and hence the number of free parameters, increases
the fit of the empirical model.20 Third, the estimates of λ are positively related to the selected
lag order. The DSGE model restrictions help in part because they reduce the number of free pa-
rameters, and this reduction becomes more valuable the larger the lag length. In the following,
we therefore decide to examine the usefulness of DSGE-VAR models with two lags.21
As before, we take draws from the posterior distributions of the DSGE-VAR model with two
lags and calculate the resulting government spending multipliers. Following Del Negro and
18Section J of the online appendix offers a presentation of the DSGE-VAR methodology.
19See Figure OA4 of the online appendix.
20The estimated log-marginal likelihood values for a range of DSGE-VAR models are displayed in Figure OA5
of the online appendix.
21In Figure OA6 of the online appendix, we report the empirical distribution of the DSGE-VAR with two and
four lags and show that the two posterior means are very close. To assess the invertibility issue, we plot the response
functions to a government spending shock associated with the DSGE-VAR(∞,2) and with DSGE models and show
that they are nearly identical (Figure OA8 of the online appendix).
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Schorfheide (2004), it is natural to use the theoretical DSGE model to provide the prior infor-
mation that enables the identification of shocks. Indeed, the contemporaneous relationships
between the DSGE model variables allow us to orthogonalize the shocks that affect the model
dynamics. The mapping between the canonical residuals and the structural shocks is obtained
by multiplying the Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix of the canonical residuals
by the factorization of a standardized version of the matrix B(θ) in the DSGE state-space rep-
resentation.22 With such a mapping and the moving-average representation of the VAR model,
dynamic responses of endogenous variables to structural shocks (especially the government
spending shock) can be computed.
Figure 3 displays the empirical distribution of the impact output multiplier for the DSGE-
VAR(0.6,2) model. The posterior mean is rather large, at 1.56, supporting the GiU and Full
versions of the DSGE model. Conversely, the Baseline and HtM specifications yield output
multipliers far below the empirical distribution obtained from the DSGE-VAR model.23
To assess the relative performance of the alternative DSGE specifications, we compare their
impulse response functions after a 1-percent increase in government spending to those ob-
tained from the flexible DSGE-VAR. We concentrate our analysis on the estimated impulse
responses of output, consumption, investment and the (ex-post) real interest rate, as we are
searching for a proper transmission mechanism. Figure 4 reports the dynamic responses in
the DSGE-VAR(0.6,2) together with the 90 percent confidence interval. It also includes the es-
timated dynamic response in the four alternative specifications. As is clear from the figure,
the GiU and Full versions properly match the positive and persistent response of private con-
sumption after a government spending shock. This is not the case for the Smets-Wouters and
22See Del Negro and Schorfheide (2009) for a refinement of the identification procedure.
23Notice that the unit-root technology shock in the theoretical DSGE model induces a common stochastic trend in
the levels of all real variables. We also estimated a vector error correction model (VECM) with a DSGE-based prior
by simply adding the cointegrating relations of the DSGE model to the VAR model. Although the VECM helps to
improve the approximation of the DSGE model (via a slightly higher marginal likelihood), we found that the DSGE
model maps quite well into the VAR model. Figure OA7 of the online appendix displays the empirical distributions
of the output multiplier associated with DSGE-VECMs with 2 and 4 lags. The estimated impact multipliers are very
close to those obtained from the DSGE-VARs.
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HtM versions, which yield a persistent negative consumption response. For the HtM version,
this is due to the small estimated value of ω. Moreover, these two versions under-estimate the
response of output, especially in the short run. The response of investment in each version
does not well match that obtained from the DSGE-VAR(0.6,2), as investment does not respond
sufficiently to a government shock. Notice again that the GiU and Full versions must be pre-
ferred, as the response of investment is more pronounced. Finally, the responses of the real
interest rate are fairly well reproduced by the GiU and Full versions, whereas this is not the
case for models that do not include this feature.
Why do the GiU and/or Full versions match these responses well? Part of the answer lies in
the dynamics of the marginal utility of consumption.24 In the presence of government spending
in the utility function, Edgeworth complementarity between private and public consumption
plays the same role as a positive preference shock that increases private consumption after a
positive government spending shock. While a government spending shock makes households
persistently poorer (the estimated persistence of the shock is large), they seek to consume more.
The only choice they have is then to offer more labor to sustain their consumption plan. This
is why output can increase substantially in the short run. For their part, firms use more labor
input such that the marginal productivity of capital increases, creating incentives to invest
more.25 The large increase in the real interest rate simply reflects the persistent rise in capital
productivity. The Baseline and HtM versions cannot generate these patterns because private
consumption falls and the increase in labor supply is not sufficient to yield a large positive
response of the marginal productivity of capital.
4.2. DSGE misspecification and fiscal multipliers. The DSGE-VAR approach allows us to de-
termine whether the fiscal multipliers obtained in a constrained DSGE model are far from those
obtained in a DSGE-VAR model. If they are close, this means that the features included in the
24To simplify the exposition, we abstract from nominal rigidities.
25See Dupaigne and Fève (2015) for the analytics of the investment channel in small-scale DSGE models.
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DSGE model are consistent with empirical evidence. We complete the previous exercise by
comparing each DSGE specification with the associated DSGE-VAR model, (i.e., incorporating
the same structural features).
Table III. Government spending multiplier in DSGE-VAR models
Model DSGE DSGE-VAR DSGE-VARDSGE
M0: Baseline 0.590 1.013 1.717
M1: HtM 0.768 1.064 1.385
M2: GiU 1.756 1.543 0.879
M3: Full 1.695 1.556 0.918
Note: This table reports the impact output multiplier. Baseline: Smets-Wouters
type model; HtM: model with hand-to-mouth consumers; GiU: model with
government spending in the utility function; Full: model with both hand-to-
mouth consumers and government spending in the utility function. The DSGE-
VAR model includes two lags.
Table III reports the estimated government spending multiplier in both the DSGE case and
the DSGE-VAR case for each model version. The estimated value of the multiplier increases
substantially in the Baseline and HtM versions, while it remains very similar in the GiU and
Full model versions.26 For example, the estimated multiplier in the DSGE-VAR model increases
by 40 percent relative to the constrained HtM model version. This is in contrast to the GiU
specification, for which the relative change is only 12 percent. This finding supports our claim
that Edgeworth complementarity is a better representation of the transmission mechanism of
fiscal policy in the euro area.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper uses the DSGE-VAR approach to assess the relative contributions to the size of
estimated fiscal multipliers of two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks,
namely hand-to-mouth consumers and Edgeworth complementarity. Although a Bayesian
prior predictive analysis highlights that the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers yields larger
26Figure OA9 of the online appendix displays the dynamic responses of output, consumption, investment and
the real interest rate to a government spending shock for each DSGE-VAR specification. The four responses are
much closer than those obtained with pure DSGE models.
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multipliers than the introduction of Edgeworth complementarity, our posterior estimates sug-
gest the opposite. A model with Edgeworth complementarity provides a better fit and enriches
the propagation mechanism of government spending shocks. In fact, a small change in the
degree of Edgeworth complementarity substantially impacts the estimated share of hand-to-
mouth consumers. We also obtain that Edgeworth complementarity yields dynamic responses
close to those obtained with the flexible DSGE-VAR model, i.e., a large output multiplier and
a positive private consumption response. Conversely, the estimated share of hand-to-mouth
consumers is too small to replicate the positive response of private consumption.
In our quantitative assessment, we deliberately abstracted from relevant details to concen-
trate on the two competing mechanisms. However, the relevant literature has emphasized
other modeling and policy issues that might affect and enrich our findings. We mention two of
them. First, we only concentrated our analysis on hand-to-mouth consumers and Edgeworth
complementarity. There are other relevant mechanisms (externalities, deep habits, productive
government investment), and a systematic evaluation of their relative merits may help to im-
prove our understanding of the effects of government activity. Second, we assumed lump-sum
taxes to finance the government deficit, but a more realistic representation would consider dis-
tortionary taxes with feedback rules. The way in which government expenditures are financed
by distortionary taxes could impact the transmission mechanism of fiscal shocks in the euro
area.
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FIGURE 1. Empirical relationship between ω and αg. The thick line is the nonparamet-
ric regression and the thick dashed lines delineate the 90 percent confidence interval
obtained by standard bootstrap techniques. The cross indicates the average parameter
values for αg and ω.
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FIGURE 2. Posterior distribution of ω and αg and area for a positive consumption
response. The red lines correspond to the posterior distributions, panels (a) and (b),
and to the constant elevation of the joint posterior distributions, panel (c); the grey area
reflects the range of values for which the instantaneous response of consumption is
positive after a government spending shock.
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FIGURE 3. Empirical distributions of the impact output multiplier. Baseline: Smets-
Wouters type model; HtM: model with hand-to-mouth consumers; GiU: model with
government spending in the utility function; Full: model with both hand-to-mouth
consumers and government spending in the utility function; DSGE-VAR(0.6,2): combi-
nation of a Full-DSGE model with a VAR.
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FIGURE 4. Impulse response functions to a government spending shock. The solid line
corresponds to the mean of the dynamic responses obtained from the DSGE-VAR(0.6,2)
model. The light grey area corresponds to the 90 percent confidence interval. Circle:
Smets-Wouters type model (Baseline); Triangle: model with hand-to-mouth consumers
(HtM); x-mark: model with government spending in the utility function (GiU); Pen-
tagram: model with both hand-to-mouth consumers and government spending in the
utility function (Full).
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Online Appendix
A. MEDIUM-SCALE DSGE MODELS
In this section we describe the DSGE models of the euro area economy with distinct trans-
mission mechanisms for government spending shocks. All these models have a common core
which is close to Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010). In
particular, each model includes features such as habit formation, investment adjustment costs,
variable capital utilisation, monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets, and nomi-
nal price and wage rigidities. This setup is extended in two directions: (i) the introduction of
households being hand-to-mouth consumers and (ii) the introduction of government spending
in the household utility function in a non-separable way.
A.1. Baseline model
The economy is populated by five classes of agents: producers of a final good, intermediate
goods producers, households, employment agencies and the public sector (government and
monetary authorities).
A.1.1. Household sector
Employment agencies–. Each household indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] is a monopolistic supplier of spe-
cialised labor Nj,t. At every point in time t, a large number of competitive “employment agen-
cies” combine households’ labor into a homogenous labor input Nt sold to intermediate firms,
according to Nt =
[∫ 1
0 Nj,t
1
εw,t dj
]εw,t
. Profit maximization by the perfectly competitive em-
ployment agencies implies the labor demand function Nj,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
)− εw,tεw,t−1 Nt, where Wj,t is
the wage paid by the employment agencies to the household supplying labor variety j, while
Wt ≡
(∫ 1
0 Wj,t
1
εw,t−1 dj
)εw,t−1
is the wage paid by intermediate firms for the homogenous labor
input sold to them by the agencies. The exogenous variable εw,t measures the substitutability
across labor varieties and its steady-state is the desired steady-state wage mark-up over the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
Household’s preferences–. The preferences of the jth household are given by
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βsεb,t+s
(
log (C∗t+s − hC∗t+s−1)−
N1+νj,t+s
1+ ν
+ V (Gt+s)
)
,
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon information avail-
able at t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, h ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of habit
formation, and ν > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. C∗t is a consumption
measure (C∗t = Ct, where Ct is real consumption, in the baseline version), Nj,t is labor of type j,
and εb,t is a preference shock.
As we explain below, households are subject to idiosyncratic shocks about whether they
are able to re-optimise their wage. Hence, the above described problem makes the choices of
wealth accumulation contingent upon a particular history of wage rate decisions, thus leading
to the heterogeneity of households. For the sake of tractability, we assume that the momentary
utility function is separable across consumption, real balances and leisure. Combining this
with the assumption of a complete set of contingent claims market, all the households will
make the same choices regarding consumption and money holding, and will only differ by
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their wage rate and supply of labor. This is directly reflected in our notations. Finally, V (Gt) is
a positive concave function, meaning that agents do not necessarily feel worse off when public
expenditures increase. Notice that this term has no effect on the equilibrium.
Household j’s period budget constraint is given by
Pt (Ct + It) + Tt + Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + Aj,t + Dt +Wj,tNj,t +
(
Rkt ut − Ptϑ (ut)
)
K¯t−1,
where It is investment, Tt denotes nominal lump-sum taxes (transfers if negative), Bt is the
one-period riskless bond, Rt is the nominal interest rate on bonds, Aj,t is the net cash flow from
household’s j portfolio of state contingent securities, Dt is the equity payout received from
the ownership of firms. The capital utilisation rate ut transforms physical capital K¯t into the
service flow of effective capital Kt according to Kt = utK¯t−1, and the effective capital is rented
to intermediate firms at the nominal rental rate Rkt . The costs of capital utilization per unit of
capital is given by the convex function ϑ (ut). We assume that u = 1, ϑ (1) = 0, and we define
ηu ≡ [ϑ′′ (1) /ϑ′ (1)] /[1+ ϑ′′ (1) /ϑ′ (1)].27 The physical capital accumulates according to
K¯t = (1− δ) K¯t−1 + ε i,t
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate of capital, and S (.) is an adjustment cost function which
satisfies S (γz) = S′ (γz) = 0 and S′′ (γz) = ηk > 0, γz is the steady-state (gross) growth rate
of technology, and ε i,t is an investment shock. Households set nominal wages according to
a staggering mechanism. In each period, a fraction θw of households cannot choose its wage
optimally, but adjusts it to keep up with the increase in the general wage level in the previous
period according to the indexation rule Wj,t = γzpi1−γwpi
γw
t−1Wj,t−1, where pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 repre-
sents the gross inflation rate, pi is steady-state (or trend) inflation and the coefficient γw ∈ [0, 1]
is the degree of indexation to past wages. The remaining fraction of households chooses instead
an optimal wage, subject to the labor demand function Nj,t.
A.1.2. Business sector
Final good producers–. At every point in time t, a perfectly competitive sector produces a final
good Yt by combining a continuum of intermediate goods Yt (ς), ς ∈ [0, 1], according to the
technology Yt =
[∫ 1
0 Yς,t
1
εp,t dς
]εp,t
. Final good producing firms take their output price, Pt, and
their input prices, Pς,t, as given and beyond their control. Profit maximization implies Yς,t =(
Pς,t
Pt
)− εp,tεp,t−1 Yt from which we deduce the relationship between the final good and the prices
of the intermediate goods Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0 Pς,t
1
εp,t−1 dς
]εp,t−1
. The exogenous variable εp,t measures the
substitutability across differentiated intermediate goods and its steady state is then the desired
steady-state price markup over the marginal cost of intermediate firms.
Intermediate-goods firms–. Intermediate good ς is produced by a monopolist firm using the fol-
lowing production function
Yς,t = Kς,tα [ZtNς,t]
1−α − ZtF,
where α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital share, Kς,t and Nς,t denote the amounts of capital and
effective labor used by firm ς, F is a fixed cost of production that ensures that profits are zero in
steady state, and Zt is an exogenous labor-augmenting productivity factor whose growth-rate
is denoted by εz,t ≡ Zt/Zt−1. In addition, we assume that intermediate firms rent capital and
labor in perfectly competitive factor markets.
Intermediate firms set prices according to a staggering mechanism. In each period, a fraction
θp of firms cannot choose its price optimally, but adjusts it to keep up with the increase in the
27Later, we estimate ηu rather than the elasticity ϑ′′ (1) /ϑ′ (1) to avoid convergence issues.
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general price level in the previous period according to the indexation rule Pς,t = pi1−γppi
γp
t−1Pς,t−1,where
the coefficient γp ∈ [0, 1] indicates the degree of indexation to past prices. The remaining frac-
tion of firms chooses its price P?ς,t optimally, by maximizing the present discounted value of
future profits
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(
βθp
)s Λt+s
Λt
{
Πpt,t+sP
?
ς,tYς,t+s −
[
Wt+sNς,t+s + Rkt+sKς,t+s
]}
,
where
Πpt,t+s =
{
∏sν=1 pi
1−γppiγpt+v−1 s > 0
1 s = 0,
subject to the demand from final goods firms and the production function. Λt+s is the marginal
utility of consumption for the representative household that owns the firm.
A.1.3. Public sector
Real (unproductive) government purchases Gt is set according to
Gt
Zt
= gG˜tεg,t,
where g denotes the deterministic steady-state value of Gt/Zt, εg,t is a government spending
shock, and G˜t is an endogenous component of the policy, assumed to follow the simple rule
G˜t =
(
Yt
γzYt−1
)ϕg
.
The parameter ϕg is the policy rule parameter linking the stationary component of govern-
ment policy to demeaned output growth. If ϕg > 0, the policy rule contains a procyclical
component that triggers an increase in government expenditures whenever output growth is
above its average value. In contrast, if ϕg < 0, the policy rule features a countercyclical com-
ponent, and thus reflects automatic stabilizers. When ϕg = 0, the stationary component of
government policy is exogenous.
The monetary authority follows a generalised-Taylor rule by gradually adjusting the nomi-
nal interest rate in response to inflation, the output gap and a change in the output gap:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ϕr [(pit
pi
)ϕpi ( Yt
Yf ,t
)ϕy (YtYf ,t−1
Yt−1Yf ,t
)ϕ∆y](1−ϕr)
εr,t,
where R is the steady state of the gross nominal interest rate and εr,t is a monetary policy
shock. The output gap is defined as the ratio of actual to potential output Yf ,t (i.e. the level of
output that would prevail under flexible prices and constant elasticity of substitution among
intermediate goods and labor types). The parameter ϕr captures the degree of interest-rate
smoothing.
A.1.4. Market clearing and stochastic processes
Market clearing conditions on final goods market are given by
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + ϑ (ut) K¯t−1,
∆p,tYt = (utK¯t−1)
α
(ZtNt)
1−α − ZtF,
where ∆p,t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pς,t
Pt
)− εp,tεp,t−1 dς is a measure of the price dispersion.
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Regarding the properties of the stochastic variables, productivity and monetary policy shocks
evolve according to log (εx,t) = ζx,t, with x ∈ {z, r}. The remaining exogenous variables fol-
low an AR(1) process log (εx,t) = ρx log (εx,t−1) + ζx,t, with x ∈ {b, i, g, p, w}. In all cases,
ζx,t ∼ i.i.d.N
(
0, σ2x
)
.
A.2. Introducing two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks
We consider extended versions in order to introduce different transmission mechanisms of
government spending shocks.
As in Galí, Lopez-Salido and Vallès (2007), we assume in a first specification (labelled ’HtM’)
(i) that a fraction ω of households, called hand-to-mouth consumers, do not have access to fi-
nancial markets and simply consume their disposable income in each and every period, (ii) the
employment agencies do not discriminate between household types in their labor demands,
such that the number of hours worked Nt is the same for all households. It follows that, in a
symmetric equilibrium, all households have the same wage rate Wt. Therefore, the hand-to-
mouth consumers set nominal consumption expenditure Cr,t equal to their disposable wage
income less lump-sum taxes Tr,t. This results in the following period-by-period budget con-
straint:
PtCr,t ≤WtNt − Tr,t
The consumption of households who have access to financial markets is denoted C0,t. Accord-
ingly, total private consumption is then defined as Ct = (1−ω)Co,t +ωCr,t.
A second specification (labelled ’GiU’) augments the baseline model with government spend-
ing in the utility function. As in Bouakez and Rebei (2007), we allow for complementar-
ity/substitutability between private consumption and public expenditures. Formally, the con-
sumption bundle C∗t is now defined as
C∗t = Ct + αgGt,
where the parameter αg measures the degree of complementarity/substitutability between pri-
vate consumption and public expenditures. The specification adopted here follows Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992), McGrattan (1994), Finn (1998), among others. If αg > 0, government
spending substitutes for private consumption, with perfect substitution if αg = 1, as in Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1992). In this case, a permanent increase in government spending has
no effect on output and hours but reduces private consumption, through a perfect crowding-
out effect. In the special case αg = 0, we recover the standard business cycle model, with
government spending operating through a negative wealth effect on labor supply (see Aiya-
gari, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992, Baxter and King, 1993). When the parameter αg < 0,
government spending complements private consumption. Then, it can be the case (depending
on the labor supply elasticity) that private consumption will react positively to an unexpected
increase in government spending.
A last specification (labelled ’Full’) embeds both hand-to-mouth consumers and government
spending in the utility function in the baseline model.
IN SEARCH OF THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE EURO AREA 33
B. EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS, STEADY-STATE AND LOG-LINEARIZATION
B.1. Equilibrium conditions
This section reports the first-order conditions for the agents’ optimizing problems and the
other relationships that define the equilibrium of the models.
Effective capital:
Kt = utK¯t−1
Capital accumulation:
K¯t = (1− δ) K¯t−1 + ε i,t
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It
Marginal utility of consumption:
Λt =
εb,t
C∗t − hC∗t−1
− βhEt
{
εb,t+1
C∗t+1 − hC∗t
}
C∗t = Ct
Consumption Euler equation:
Λt = βRtEt
{
Λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
}
Investment equation:
1 = Qtε i,t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− It
It−1
S′
(
It
It−1
)]
+ βEt
{
Λt+1
Λt
Qt+1ε i,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
S′
(
It+1
It
)}
Tobin’s Q:
Qt = βEt
{
Λt+1
Λt
[
Rkt+1
Pt+1
ut+1 − ϑ (ut+1) + (1− δ)Qt+1
]}
Capital utilization:
Rkt = Ptϑ
′ (ut)
Production function:
Yi,t = Ki,tα [ZtNi,t]
1−α − ZtF
Labor demand:
Wt = (1− α) Zt
(
Kt
ZtNt
)α
MCt
where MCt is the nominal marginal cost.
Capital renting:
Rkt = α
(
Kt
ZtNt
)α−1
MCt
Price setting:
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(
βθp
)s Λt+s
Λt
Y?t,t+s
[
P?t Π
p
t,t+s − εp,t+s MCt+s
]
= 0
Aggregate price index:
Pt =
[(
1− θp
)
(P?t )
1/(εp,t−1) + θp
(
pi1−γppiγpt−1Pt−1
)1/(εp,t−1)](εp,t−1)
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Wage setting:
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βθw)
s Λt+sN?t,t+s
[
W?t
Pt+s
Πwt,t+s − εb,t+sεw,t+s
(
N?t,t+s
)ν
Λt+s
]
= 0
Aggregate wage index:
Wt =
[
(1− θw) (W?t )1/(εw,t−1) + θw
(
γzpi
1−γwpiγwt−1Wt−1
)1/(εw,t−1)](εw,t−1)
Government spending:
Gt
Zt
= g×
(
Yt
γzYt−1
)ϕg
εg,t
Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ϕr [(pit
pi
)ϕpi ( Yt
Yf ,t
)ϕy (YtYf ,t−1
Yt−1Yf ,t
)ϕ∆y](1−ϕr)
εr,t
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + ϑ (ut) K¯t−1
∆p,tYt = (utK¯t−1)
α
[ZtNt]
1−α − ZtF
Model with hand-to-mouth consumers:
PtCr,t = WtNt − Tr,t
Ct = (1−ω)Co,t +ωCr,t
Model with government spending in the utility function:
C∗t = Ct + αgGt
B.2. Stationary equilibrium
To find the steady state, we express the model in stationary form. Thus, for the non-stationary
variables, let lower-case denote their value relative to the technology process Zt:
yt ≡ Yt/Zt kt ≡ Kt/Zt k¯t ≡ K¯t/Zt it ≡ It/Zt ct ≡ Ct/Zt
gt ≡ Gt/Zt λt ≡ ΛtZt wt ≡Wt/ (ZtPt) w?t ≡W?t / (ZtPt) c∗t ≡ C∗t /Zt
co,t ≡ Co,t/Zt cr,t ≡ Cr,t/Zt
where we note that the marginal utility of consumption Λt will shrink as the economy grows,
and we express the wage in real terms. Also, we denote the real rental rate of capital and real
marginal cost by
rkt ≡ Rkt /Pt and mct ≡ MCt/Pt,
and the optimal relative price as
p?t ≡ P?t /Pt.
Then we can rewrite the model in terms of stationary variables as follows.
Effective capital:
kt =
ut k¯t−1
εz,t
Capital accumulation:
k¯t = (1− δ) k¯t−1
εz,t
+ ε i,t
(
1− S
(
it
it−1
εz,t
))
it
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Marginal utility of consumption:
λt =
εb,t
c∗t − h
c∗t−1
εz,t
− βhEt

εb,t+1
εz,t+1
(
c∗t+1 − h
c∗t
εz,t+1
)

c∗t = ct
Consumption Euler equation:
λt = βRtEt
{
λt+1
εz,t+1pit+1
}
Investment equation:
1 = qtε i,t
[
1− S
(
it
it−1
εz,t
)
− it
it−1
εz,tS′
(
it
it−1
εz,t
)]
+ βEt
{
λt+1
λtεz,t+1
qt+1ε i,t+1
(
it+1
it
εz,t+1
)2
S′
(
it+1
it
εz,t+1
)}
Tobin’s Q:
qt = βEt
{
λt+1
λtεz,t+1
[
rkt+1ut+1 − ϑ (ut+1) + (1− δ) qt+1
]}
Capital utilization:
rkt = ϑ
′ (ut)
Production function:
yi,t = kαi,tN
1−α
i,t − F
Labor demand:
wt = (1− α)
(
kt
Nt
)α
mct
Capital renting:
rkt = α
(
kt
Nt
)α−1
mct
Price setting:
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(
βθp
)s λt+s
λt
y?t,t+s
[
p?t
Pt
Pt+s
Πpt,t+s − εp,t+smct+s
]
= 0
Aggregate price index:
1 =
[(
1− θp
)
(p?t )
1/(εp,t−1) + θp
(
pi1−γppiγpt−1
1
pit
)1/(εp,t−1)](εp,t−1)
Wage setting:
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βθw)
s λt+sN?t,t+s
[
w?t
Pt
Pt+s
Zt
Zt+s
Πwt,t+s − εb,t+sεw,t+s
Nνt,t+s
λt+s
]
= 0
Aggregate wage index:
wt =
[
(1− θw) (w?t )1/(εw,t−1) + θw
(
γzpi
1−γwpiγwt−1
wt−1
pitεz,t
)1/(εw,t−1)](εw,t−1)
Government spending:
gt = g×
(
εz,tyt
γzyt−1
)ϕg
εg,t
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Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ϕr [(pit
pi
)ϕpi ( yt
y f ,t
)ϕy (yty f ,t−1
yt−1y f ,t
)ϕ∆y](1−ϕr)
εr,t
Resource constraint:
yt = ct + it + gt + ϑ (ut) k¯t−1/εz,t
∆p,tyt =
(
ut k¯t−1
)α N1−αt − F
Model with hand-to-mouth consumers:
cr,t = wtNt − tr,t
ct = (1−ω) co,t +ωcr,t
Model with government spending in the utility function:
c∗t = ct + αggt
B.3. Steady state
We use the stationary version of the model to find the steady state, and we let variables
without a time subscript denote steady-state values. First, we have that R = (γzpi) /β and the
expression for Tobin’s Q implies that the rental rate of capital is
rk =
γz
β
− (1− δ)
and the price-setting equation gives marginal cost as
mc =
1
εp
.
The capital/labor ratio can then be retrieved using the capital renting equation:
k
N
=
(
α
mc
rk
)1/(1−α)
,
and the wage is given by the labor demand equation as
w = (1− α)mc
(
k
N
)α
.
The production function gives the output/labor ratio as
y
N
=
(
k
N
)α
− F
N
,
and the fixed cost F is set to obtain zero profits at the steady state, implying
F
N
=
(
k
N
)α
− w− rk k
N
.
The output/labor ratio is then given by
y
N
= w + rk
k
N
=
rk
α
k
N
.
Finally, to determine the investment/output ratio, we use the expressions for effective capital
and physical capital accumulation to get
i
k
=
(
1− 1− δ
γz
)
γz =⇒ iy =
i
k
k
N
N
y
=
(
1− 1− δ
γz
)
αγz
rk
.
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Given the government spending/output ratio g/y, the consumption/output ratio is then given
by the resource constraint as
c
y
= 1− i
y
− g
y
.
Model with hand-to-mouth consumers:
cr = wN − tr
c = co = cr
In what follows, tr is assumed to be zero.
Model with government spending in the utility function:
c∗ = c + αgg
B.4. Log-linearized version
We log-linearize the stationary model around the steady state. Let χˆt denote the log devia-
tion of the variable χt from its steady-state level˙ χ: χˆt ≡ log (χt/χ). The log-linearized model
is then given by the following system of equations for the endogenous variables.
Effective capital:
kˆt + εˆz,t = uˆt + ̂¯kt−1
Capital accumulation:
̂¯kt = 1− δ
γz
(̂¯kt−1 − εˆz,t)+(1− 1− δ
γz
)
(ıˆt + εˆ i,t)
Marginal utility of consumption:
λˆt =
hγz
(γz − hβ) (γz − h) cˆ
∗
t−1 −
γ2z + h2β
(γz − hβ) (γz − h) cˆ
∗
t +
hβγz
(γz − hβ) (γz − h)Et cˆ
∗
t+1
− hγz
(γz − hβ) (γz − h) εˆz,t +
hβγz
(γz − hβ) (γz − h)Et εˆz,t+1
+
γz
γz − hβ εˆb,t −
hβ
γz − hβEt εˆb,t+1
cˆ∗t = cˆt
Consumption Euler equation:
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
(
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1
)− Et εˆz,t+1
Investment equation:
ıˆt =
1
1+ β
(ıˆt−1 − εˆz,t) + β1+ βEt (ıˆt+1 + εˆz,t+1) +
1
ηkγ2z (1+ β)
(qˆt + εˆ i,t)
Tobin’s Q:
qˆt =
β (1− δ)
γz
Etqˆt+1 +
(
1− β (1− δ)
γz
)
Etrˆkt+1 − (rˆt − Etpˆit+1)
Capital utilization:
uˆt =
1− ηu
ηu
rˆkt
Production function:
yˆt =
y + F
y
(
αkˆt + (1− α) nˆt
)
Labor demand:
wˆt = m̂ct + αkˆt − αnˆt
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Capital renting:
rˆkt = m̂ct − (1− α) kˆt + (1− α) nˆt
Phillips curve:
pˆit =
γp
1+ βγp
pit−1 +
β
1+ βγp
Etpit+1 +
(
1− βθp
) (
1− θp
)
θp
(
1+ βγp
) (m̂ct + εˆp,t)
Wage curve:
wˆt =
1
1+ β
wˆt−1 +
β
1+ β
Etwˆt+1 +
(1− βθw) (1− θw)
θw (1+ β)
(
1+ ν εwεw−1
) (m̂rst − wˆt + εˆw,t)
+
γw
1+ β
pˆit−1 − 1+ βγw1+ β pˆit +
β
1+ β
Etpˆit+1 − 11+ β εˆz,t +
β
1+ β
Et εˆz,t+1
Marginal rate of substitution:
m̂rst = νnˆt − λˆt + εˆb,t
Government spending:
gˆt = ϕg (yˆt − yˆt−1 + εˆz,t) + εˆg,t
Monetary policy rule:
Rˆt = ϕrRˆt−1 + (1− ϕr)
[
ϕpipˆit + ϕy (yˆt − yˆt−1) + ϕ∆y
((
yˆt − yˆ f ,t
)− (yˆt−1 − yˆ f ,t−1))]+ εˆr,t
Resource constraint:
yˆt =
c
y
cˆt +
i
y
ıˆt +
g
y
gˆt +
rkk
y
uˆt
Model with hand-to-mouth consumers:
cˆr,t =
wn
c
(wˆt + nˆt)
cˆt = (1−ω) cˆo,t +ωcˆr,t
Model with government spending in the utility function:
cˆ∗t =
c
c + αgg
cˆt +
αgg
c + αgg
gˆt
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C. PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
Table OA1. Prior Distributions for Parameters
HtM share, ω Edgeworth compl., αg Habit in consumption, h
U [0.50,0.28] U [0.00,1.30] B[0.50,0.20]
Capital utilisation cost, ηu Investment adj. cost, ηk TFP growth rate, log (γz)
B[0.50,0.10] G[4.00,1.00] G[0.40,0.10]
Calvo parameters, θp, θw Indexation parameters, γp,γw MP–smoothing, ϕr
B[0.66,0.10] B[0.50,0.15] B[0.75,0.10]
MP–inflation, ϕpi MP–output gap, ϕy, ϕ∆y Shocks persistence,
ρw, ρb, ρi,
ρp, ρg
G[2.00,0.30] G[0.125,0.10] B[0.50,0.20]
Shocks volatility, σw, σb, σi,
σp, σr, σe
Shocks volatility, σz, σg
IG[0.25,2.00] IG[1.00,2.00]
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D. A COMPLEMENT TO THE PRIOR PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Table OA2. Government Spending Multiplier Probabilities Implied by Prior
Predictive Analysis with Informative Priors on ω and αg
Prob
( ∆Y
∆G> 1
)
Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
ω 0.933 0.548 0.307 0.224 0.249
αg 0.497 0.422 0.367 0.320 0.305
ω and αg 0.706 0.630 0.529 0.477 0.482
Prob
( ∆C
∆G> 0
)
Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
ω 0.814 0.633 0.525 0.419 0.327
αg 0.486 0.459 0.440 0.412 0.367
ω and αg 0.696 0.645 0.614 0.587 0.536
Prob
( ∆I
∆G> 0
)
Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
ω 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
αg 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311
ω and αg 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127
Note: This table reports the government spending multiplier probabilities when all the
parameters are set at their respective prior mean except ω and αg that are drawn in their
respective prior distributions.
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E. DSGE ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table OA3. Posterior Estimates of Alternative DSGE models
M0: Baseline M1: HtM M2: GiU M3: Full
Habit in consumption, h 0.242
[0.136,0.348]
0.232
[0.098,0.360]
0.095
[0.017,0.166]
0.141
[0.037,0.244]
Gov feedback parameter, ϕg -0.583
[-0.766,-0.403]
-0.601
[-0.784,-0.416]
-0.778
[-0.957,-0.592]
-0.733
[-0.909,-0.555]
Capital utilisation cost, ηu 0.786
[0.697,0.877]
0.777
[0.685,0.874]
0.770
[0.679,0.865]
0.779
[0.688,0.870]
Investment adj. cost, ηk 5.075
[3.852,6.323]
4.477
[3.098,5.832]
5.127
[3.813,6.446]
4.718
[3.319,6.062]
Growth rate of technology, log (γz) 0.380
[0.289,0.468]
0.395
[0.309,0.484]
0.402
[0.312,0.492]
0.416
[0.325,0.507]
Calvo price, θp 0.950
[0.930,0.970]
0.933
[0.912,0.955]
0.931
[0.914,0.948]
0.926
[0.909,0.944]
Calvo wage, θw 0.748
[0.643,0.854]
0.820
[0.687,0.932]
0.743
[0.621,0.866]
0.772
[0.595,0.915]
Price indexation, γp 0.280
[0.048,0.454]
0.152
[0.031,0.273]
0.153
[0.041,0.262]
0.145
[0.039,0.240]
Wage indexation, γw 0.280
[0.106,0.447]
0.409
[0.192,0.626]
0.304
[0.129,0.479]
0.357
[0.165,0.554]
MP–smoothing, ϕr 0.865
[0.820,0.910]
0.877
[0.827,0.928]
0.868
[0.829,0.909]
0.876
[0.833,0.918]
MP–inflation, ϕpi 1.581
[1.252,1.899]
1.611
[1.259,1.949]
1.398
[1.113,1.669]
1.472
[1.171,1.769]
MP–output gap, ϕy 0.018
[0.000,0.037]
0.023
[0.000,0.048]
0.054
[0.004,0.098]
0.070
[0.006,0.128]
MP–output gap change, ϕ∆y 0.416
[0.334,0.493]
0.414
[0.321,0.499]
0.394
[0.297,0.495]
0.405
[0.305,0.500]
Wage markup shock persistence, ρw 0.686
[0.500,0.896]
0.684
[0.515,0.894]
0.843
[0.755,0.936]
0.818
[0.704,0.950]
Intertemporal shock persistence, ρb 0.922
[0.885,0.961]
0.716
[0.540,0.896]
0.833
[0.743,0.926]
0.629
[0.451,0.816]
Investment shock persistence, ρi 0.393
[0.260,0.522]
0.386
[0.265,0.509]
0.429
[0.281,0.571]
0.448
[0.302,0.594]
Price markup shock persistence, ρp 0.391
[0.081,0.640]
0.563
[0.332,0.816]
0.609
[0.433,0.799]
0.652
[0.501,0.813]
Government shock persistence, ρg 0.981
[0.968,0.994]
0.980
[0.967,0.993]
0.982
[0.971,0.993]
0.988
[0.981,0.997]
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Table OA3. Posterior Estimates of Alternative DSGE models (cont’d)
M0: Baseline M1: HtM M2: GiU M3: Full
Wage markup shock volatility, σw 0.109
[0.071,0.146]
0.109
[0.074,0.143]
0.077
[0.059,0.094]
0.082
[0.060,0.103]
Intertemporal shock volatility σb 0.047
[0.036,0.057]
0.110
[0.063,0.156]
0.173
[0.086,0.259]
0.269
[0.152,0.383]
Investment shock volatility, σi 0.569
[0.472,0.663]
0.604
[0.503,0.705]
0.568
[0.460,0.672]
0.575
[0.474,0.681]
Price markup shock volatility, σp 0.140
[0.100,0.179]
0.114
[0.073,0.153]
0.102
[0.068,0.134]
0.094
[0.064,0.123]
Productivity shock volatility, σz 0.811
[0.720,0.903]
0.803
[0.711,0.890]
0.821
[0.727,0.910]
0.814
[0.721,0.904]
Government shock volatility, σg 0.849
[0.750,0.946]
0.855
[0.755,0.955]
0.871
[0.766,0.977]
0.851
[0.749,0.950]
Monetary policy shock volatility, σr 0.181
[0.150,0.209]
0.173
[0.144,0.199]
0.151
[0.128,0.173]
0.152
[0.129,0.174]
Measurement error volatility, σe 0.366
[0.326,0.408]
0.367
[0.326,0.407]
0.369
[0.328,0.411]
0.368
[0.327,0.409]
Note: This table reports the prior distribution, the mean and the 90 percent confidence interval (within square brack-
ets) of the estimated posterior distribution of the structural parameters. Baseline: Smets-Wouters type model; HtM:
model with hand-to-mouth consumers; GiU: model with government spending in the utility function; Full: model
with both hand-to-mouth consumers and government spending in the utility function.
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F. PRIOR AND POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
Figure OA1. Prior and Posterior Distributions of Parameters ω and αg
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Note: The grey and red lines correspond to the prior and posterior distributions, respectively.
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G. THE CONTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS
Table OA4 reports this contribution to the variance of observables for the four model ver-
sions. As it is clear from this table, the contribution of the government spending shock to
output volatility is small for the baseline and HtM model versions (less or equal to 5%), while
it is around 13% for the GiU specification. The discrepancy is even larger when it comes to the
volatility of hours worked: 7% for the HtM specification and 42% for the GiU version. Intro-
ducing government expenditures in the utility directly affects the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and hours worked and thus acts as a labor wedge. This government
spending based labor wedge then impacts output in the short-run.
Table OA4. Contribution of the Government Spending Shock (in %)
Variable Model
M0: Baseline M1: HtM M2: GiU M3: Full
Output 3.72 4.84 13.24 12.57
Consumption 3.18 1.81 5.36 4.89
Investment 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09
Government Spending 58.72 55.25 56.05 53.96
Hours Worked 5.83 7.38 42.04 49.89
Real Wages 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Inflation 0.29 0.46 4.74 2.36
Interest Rate 0.79 1.37 10.56 6.65
Note: Baseline: Smets-Wouters type model; HtM: model with hand-to-mouth consumers; GiU:
model with government spending in the utility function; Full: model with both hand-to-mouth
consumers and government spending in the utility function.
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H. IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS (IRFS) ASSOCIATED WITH THE DSGE MODELS:
PRODUCTIVITY AND MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS
Figure OA2. IRFs to a Productivity Shock
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Note: The stars correspond to the responses associated with the model with both hand-to-
mouth consumers and government spending in the utility (Full); The bullets correspond
to the responses associated with the Smets-Wouters model (Baseline).
Figure OA3. IRFs to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Note: The stars correspond to the responses associated with the model with both hand-to-
mouth consumers and government spending in the utility (Full); The bullets correspond
to the responses associated with the Smets-Wouters model (Baseline).
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I. ROBUSTNESS
I.1. The effects of data on estimation
One can legitimately wonder why the model with hand-to-mouth consumers differs so much
from the model with Edgeworth complementarity at the estimation stage. The two propagation
mechanisms can equally fit the data, as they both have the potential to yield a positive response
of private consumption to a government spending shock (see Table 1 in the main text). As
Guerron-Quintana (2010) has shown that the estimation of a structural model is sensitive to
the set of observables, this section inspects the effect of data on the estimation of the share ω.
Table OA5. Value of ω Conditional on the Set of Observables
Observables Calibration
M1: HtM M2: GiU M3: Full
Benchmark 0.284 0.324 0.333
{∆ct,∆gt} 0.311 0.466 0.462
{∆ct,∆gt,∆it} 0.367 0.481 0.469
{∆ct,∆gt,∆wt} 0.267 0.409 0.414
{∆ct,∆gt,∆it, nt} 0.324 0.398 0.412
{∆ct,∆gt,∆it,∆wt} 0.216 0.321 0.269
{∆ct,∆gt,∆it,∆wt, nt} 0.280 0.342 0.325
{∆ct,∆gt,∆it,∆wt, nt,pit} 0.288 0.351 0.326
{∆ct,∆gt,∆it,∆wt, nt,Rt} 0.278 0.318 0.327
Note: This table reports the mode estimates of ω under three sets of calibration
(HtM, GiU and Full). Benchmark refers to the case where the eight observ-
ables are used for estimation. HtM: model with hand-to-mouth consumers;
GiU: model with government spending in the utility function; Full: model with
both hand-to-mouth consumers and government spending in the utility func-
tion. In all calibrations, αg = 0.
We consider the following experiment. We calibrate the DSGE model according to the pos-
terior estimates in the HtM, GiU and Full model versions, respectively. For the GiU and Full
models, we set αg = 0, i.e. we eliminate the propagation mechanism related to Edgeworth
complementarity. In other words, the HtM, GiU and Full versions only reflect a particular cali-
bration of the remaining models’ parameters. These three calibrations are considered as simple
robustness check. Given a calibration, we only estimate the share of hand-to-mouth consumers
for several sets of observables. We start with the smallest relevant set and progressively add
observables. The results are reported in Table OA5. For comparison purpose, the table includes
our benchmark results (i.e. with eight observables). When we consider private consumption
and government spending, including or not investment, we obtain a larger estimated value of
ω (whatever the calibration) compared to the benchmark estimates. The share ω is now close
to 0.5 and the HtM model version can yield more likely an output multiplier larger than one.
When we progressively extend the set of observables, the estimated value is reduced, especially
if we include real wages, hours worked, inflation or the nominal interest rate.
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Table OA6. Robustness Analysis: Posterior Estimates
Parameter Model
M0: Baseline M1: HtM M2: GiU M3: Full
Panel (a). Sub–Samples (1980Q1–1993Q4 / 1994Q1–2007Q4)
ω – 0.229
(0.065)
/ 0.363
(0.055)
– 0.073
(0.067)
/ 0.149
(0.086)
αg – – –1.400
(0.176)
/ –1.905
(0.143)
–1.309
(0.203)
/ –1.797
(0.178)
L –371.622 / –267.216 –370.044 / –257.613 –358.033 / –240.971 –359.767 / –241.439
Panel (b). News Shocks
ω – 0.300
(0.041)
– 0.143
(0.037)
αg – – –1.612
(0.140)
–1.491
(0.146)
L –642.769 –634.149 –614.159 –611.817
Panel (c). Stationary Productivity Shock
ω – 0.414
(0.047)
– 0.217
(0.039)
αg – – –1.476
(0.154)
–1.150
(0.194)
L –643.646 –632.979 –627.757 –622.546
Panel (d). Non Separable Utility
ω – 0.228
(0.033)
– 0.130
(0.032)
αg – – –1.349
(0.152)
–1.210
(0.148)
L –632.890 –628.257 –610.877 –609.971
Note: This table reports the mode and the standard error (within parentheses) of HtM share ω and Edgeworth comple-
mentarity αg. L denotes the marginal likelihood. Baseline: Smets-Wouters type model; HtM: model with hand-to-mouth
consumers; GiU: model with government spending in the utility function; Full: model with both hand-to-mouth consumers
and government spending in the utility function.
I.2. Alternative specifications
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our findings to a number of perturbations:
Sub-samples, news shocks in government spending, an alternative specification of technology
shocks and non-separability between consumption and leisure in the utility function. All the
results are reported in Table OA6. For all experiments, we use the same prior distributions for
the parameters (see Table OA1), except special comments. To save space, we only report the
parameter values for ω and αg and the marginal likelihood.
We first investigate whether our results still hold if we re-estimate the four model versions
over different sub-samples. In the period between the mid-1990s and 2007, European countries
enjoyed one of the greatest economic growth periods, known as the Great Moderation due to
the low volatility of growth rates in those years. The mid-1990s also corresponds to the pro-
gressive realisation of Economic and Monetary Union. It seems then natural to split the overall
sample in the following two parts: 1980Q1-1993Q4 and 1994Q1-2007Q4 (see Avouyi-Dovi and
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Sahuc, 2016). The results are reported in Panel (a) of Table OA6. All our previous findings
are robust to this sub-sample analysis: The GiU model version outperforms the HtM one, the
HtM specification adds very little to both the baseline model and the GiU model versions, the
share of hand-to-mouth consumers decreases when this specification is considered together
with Edgeworth complementarity.
Second, as emphasised by Ramey (2011b) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012), the expected
component in public expenditures constitutes an important element of government policy. We
accordingly modify our benchmark specification to allow for news shocks in the government
spending rule. The stationary component of government spending still follows an AR(1) but
the innovation ζg,t rewrites
ζ
(0)
g,t + ζ
(4)
g,t−4 + ζ
(8)
g,t−8,
where ζ(0)g,t , ζ
(4)
g,t−4, and ζ
(8)
g,t−8 are three independent random variables that follow a normal dis-
tribution with zero mean and variance equals to σ2g,0, σ
2
g,4 and σ
2
g,8, respectively. All variances
have the same prior distribution, i.e. an inverse gamma IG[1.00,2.00]. We obtain that gov-
ernment spending shocks explain around 20% of output variance, among which the expected
components represent more than 30%. The estimation results are reported in Panel (b) of Table
OA6. As in the previous case, none of our main results are modified.
Third, we consider a stationary version for the productivity shocks. Indeed, one can argue
that the presence of a random walk (with a positive drift) specification could affect our results
as it implies that government spending growth is affected by technology shocks.28 We relax this
assumption and specify a stationary AR(1) process for the logarithm of total factor productivity
(in deviation from a linear trend). Government expenditures are now only explained by their
own shocks. We use the same prior as before for the autoregressive parameter and the variance
of innovation. The results are reported in Panel (c) of Table OA6. We obtain a larger share of
the hand-to-mouth consumers (with an output multiplier around 1), but this model version is
still outperformed by the GiU specification (with an output multiplier around 1.80). Even if we
obtain different numbers, we reach the same conclusions about the HtM and GiU specifications.
Finally, to lower the negative wealth effect of government spending shocks when agents are
forward-looking, we introduce non-separability between consumption and leisure in the utility
function as in Smets and Wouters (2007),
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βsεb,t
[(
C∗t+s − hC∗t+s−1
)1−ψ
1− ψ exp
(
N1+νj,t+s
1+ ν
)
+ V (Gt+s)
]
.
where ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption (for constant labor).
Indeed, with non-separable preferences, an increase in hours worked has a positive effect
on the marginal utility of consumption. The reason for this is that consumption and hours
are complements in the utility function. Hence, unless monetary policy is very aggressive in
increasing interest rates, the complementarity will work to drive up consumption with the in-
crease in hours worked through the Euler equation. When the wealth effect on labor supply is
reduced, there is no need for such a large share of HtM consumers or a large degree of Edge-
worth complementarity (Panel (d) of Table OA6). For an elasticity of intertemporal substitution
estimated around 1.60-1.80, we observe that ω and αg are reduced by more than 20%. However,
this alteration has no effect on the models comparison.
28We obtain that more than 40% of the volatility of government spending growth is explained by the permanent
technology shock in the short run.
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J. DSGE-VAR METHODOLOGY
To setup the DSGE-VAR(λ, p), we follow Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004). The VAR repre-
sentation of the n× 1 vector of endogenous variables xt can be written as
xt = Φ0 +
p
∑
i=1
Φixt−i + εt,
with t = 1, ..., T and εt ∼ N (0,Σε). Let X be a T × n matrix with rows given by x′t, S be the
T × (np + 1) matrix with rows [1, x′t−1, ..., x′t−p]′, Φ = [Φ0,Φ1, ...,Φp]′, and ε be a T × n matrix
with rows ε′t. The VAR model can then be written as X = SΦ+ ε, with likelihood function
L (X|Φ,Σε) ∝ |Σε|−T/2 exp
{
−1
2
tr
[
Σ−1ε (X− SΦ)′ (X− SΦ)
]}
, (10)
where tr[.] denotes the trace of a matrix.
In the DSGE-VAR approach, the T actual observations are supposed to be augmented with
T∗ = λT artificial observations (X∗ (θ) , S∗ (θ)) generated from the DSGE model based on the
parameter vector θ. The likelihood of this artificial sample is
L (X∗ (θ) |Φ,Σε) ∝ |Σε|−λT/2 exp
{
−1
2
tr
[
Σ−1ε
[
Σ−1ε (X∗ − S∗Φ)′ (X∗ − S∗Φ)
]]}
. (11)
The joint likelihood of the samples of actual and artificial data is then
L (X∗ (θ) , X|Φ,Σε) ∝ L (X|Φ,Σε)L (X∗ (θ) |Φ,Σε)
The usual Bayesian approach is to specify a prior and update it with the likelihood of the
data, using Bayes’s rule to obtain the posterior (see An and Schorfheide, 2007, for an overview).
It means that L (X∗ (θ) |Φ,Σε) can be viewed as representing p (Φ,Σε|θ,λ), i.e. a prior for Φ
and Σε. Rather than literally simulating the artificial data, the expected (scaled) population
moments of the DSGE conditional on θ are used instead of moments from simulated data,
in order to avoid sampling variation. Let Γ∗xx (θ) = Eθ (xtx′t) /λT, Γ∗xs (θ) = Eθ (xts′t) /λT,
Γ∗sx (θ) = Eθ (stx′t) /λT and Γ∗ss (θ) = Eθ (sts′t) /λT. If Γ∗xx (θ) is invertible, then
Φ∗ (θ) = (Γ∗ss (θ))
−1 Γ∗sx (θ) ,
Σ∗ε (θ) = Γ∗xx (θ)− Γ∗xs (θ) (Γ∗ss (θ))−1 Γ∗
′
sx (θ) .
The matrices Φ∗ (θ) and Σ∗ε (θ) are restriction functions that will be used to center the prior
distribution of (Φ,Σε) conditional on θ and a hyperparameter λ ≥ 0 that measures the de-
viation of the DSGE-VAR from the VAR approximation of the DSGE model. The joint prior
distribution of the VAR and DSGE model parameters is formed hierarchically. One forms a
prior for the DSGE model, and then conditional on that prior one forms a prior view for the
VAR parameters, i.e.
p (Φ,Σε, θ|λ) = p (Φ,Σε|θ,λ) p (θ) ,
and the prior distribution of the VAR parameters is of the Inverted-W ishart–N ormal form
Σε|θ,λ ∼ IW (λTΣ∗ε (θ) ,λT − (np + 1) , n) ,
Φ|Σε, θ,λ ∼ N
(
Φ∗ (θ) ,Σε ⊗ (λTΓ∗ss (θ))−1
)
.
The posterior density of the VAR parameters conditional on (θ,λ) is proportional to the
product of the prior density and the likelihood function for the VAR model, denotedL (XT|Φ,Σε, θ,λ) .
The DSGE-VAR prior and likelihood are conjugate and hence, it follows that the posterior dis-
tribution ofΦ and Σε is also of the Inverted-W ishart–N ormal form. The joint posterior density
of the DSGE and VAR model parameters can be factorised as
p (Φ,Σε, θ|XT,λ) = p (Φ,Σε|XT, θ,λ) p (θ|XT,λ) ,
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where XT ≡ {xt}Tt=1 denotes the sample of observable data, p (Φ,Σε|XT, θ,λ) is given by the
product of the conditional posterior densities for Φ|Σε and Σε|θ, and p (θ|XT,λ), the posterior
distribution of θ for a given λ, is given by
p (θ|XT,λ) ∝ L (XT|θ,λ) p (θ) ,
where L (XT|θ,λ) = [L (XT|Φ,Σε, θ,λ) p (Φ,Σε|θ,λ)] /p (Φ,Σε|XT, θ,λ). This posterior distri-
bution is evaluated numerically using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with 1,000,000 draws.
Once a posterior sample of θ has been simulated from the DSGE-VAR(λ, p) model, one can
compute the marginal likelihood which is defined as
L (XT|λ) =
∫
θ
L (XT|θ,λ) p (θ)dθ,
and select the hyperparameter λ such as
λˆ = arg max
λ∈[(n(p+1)+1)/T,∞)
L (XT|λ) .
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K. LOG-MARGINAL LIKELIHOOD FOR ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE DSGE-VAR
MODEL
Figure OA4. Log-Marginal Likelihood for Alternative Specifications
of the DSGE-VAR(λ, 2) Model
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Note: The plain line corresponds to the log-marginal likelihood associated with a
DSGE-VAR(λ, 2) model based on a specification with both hand-to-mouth consumers
and government spending in the utility; The dashed line corresponds to the log-
marginal likelihood associated with a DSGE-VAR(λ, 2) based on the baseline DSGE
resctrictions.
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L. LOG-MARGINAL LIKELIHOOD OF THE DSGE-VAR MODEL FOR DIFFERENT LAG ORDERS
Figure OA5. Log-Marginal Likelihood of the DSGE-VAR(λ, p) Model
for Different Lag Orders
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Note: The DSGE-VAR(λ, p) model is based on the specification with both hand-to-
mouth consumers and government spending in the utility function.
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M. EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE DSGE-VAR OUTPUT MULTIPLIER
Figure OA6. Empirical Distribution of the DSGE-VAR(λ, p) Output Multiplier
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Note: The DSGE-VAR model is based on the specification with both hand-to-mouth con-
sumers and government spending in the utility function.
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N. EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE DSGE-VECM OUTPUT MULTIPLIER
Figure OA7. Empirical Distribution of the DSGE-VECM(λ, p) Output Multiplier
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Note: The DSGE-VECM model is based on the specification with both hand-to-mouth con-
sumers and government spending in the utility function.
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O. INVERTIBILITY ASSESSMENT
Figure OA8. Impulse Response Functions to a Government Spending
Shock Associated with the DSGE-VAR(∞,2) and DSGE Models
0 5 10 15
0.25
0.3
0.35
Output
0 5 10 15
0.16
0.18
0.2
Consumption
0 5 10 15
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Investment
0 5 10 15
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Real Interest Rate
Note: The DSGE-VAR(∞,2) model (plain line) and the DSGE model (stars) are
based on the specification with both hand-to-mouth consumers and government
spending in the utility function.
56 IN SEARCH OF THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE EURO AREA
P. IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS (IRFS) ASSOCIATED WITH ALTERNATIVE DSGE-VAR(λ,2)
SPECIFICATIONS
Figure OA9. IRFs to a Government Spending Shock
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Note: Circle: DSGE-VAR model with the Smets-Wouters specification (Base-
line); Triangle: DSGE-VAR model with hand-to-mouth consumers (HtM); x-mark:
DSGE-VAR model with government spending in the utility function (GiU); Pen-
tagram: DSGE-VAR model with both hand-to-mouth consumers and government
spending in the utility function (Full).
